A New START – Obama Abandons Hope for Realism? July 6, 2009
Posted by Sean Varner in Nuclear Proliferation, President Obama, Russia, U.S. Foreign Relations.Tags: global zero, Medvedev, Missile Defense, nuclear reductions, Nuclear Weapons, President Obama, Russia, START Treaty
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President Obama and Russian President Medvedev have reached a preliminary agreement on the reduction of nuclear weapons. It is far from a land-breaking accord. A close look at the numbers reveals that, at the end of the day, either Obama became a realist or Medvedev made the more persuasive case. My hope is the former.
The two leaders reached an agreement on limiting the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,500 – 1,675. The previous limit, under the Moscow Treaty of 2002, was within the range of 1,700 – 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Therefore, President Obama, the nuclear abolitionist who advocates a world free of nuclear weapons, has brought the limit down by 25 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Perhaps that is too cynical – after all, the lower limits are for all intents and purproses meaningless – so perhaps he can be credited with reducing the number by 525. Though it seems like a radical reduction, it is still within 25 warheads of the range the Bush Administration determined was adequate for U.S. national security.
The Russians had previously stated they would be unwilling to go below 1,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. It is therefore likely that Obama pushed for the lower limit (1,500) while Medvedev pushed for as high of a limit as he could achieve (1,675) that was still below the Moscow Treaty lower limit of 1,700. In this aspect of the accord, it is likely that Medvedev’s tenacity is mostly responsible for the warhead levels.
The range that Obama and Medvedev reached on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) is a much wider gap of 500-1,100. The Russians, whose SNDV levels will decline from roughly 680 to less than 400 within ten years due to systems reaching the end of their service lives, pushed for the lower limit for two main reasons. They wish to maintain parity with the U.S. and, if they could not push the U.S. to reach that lower limit, could at least save face by insisting on a low SNDV limit to make it look like they were disarming more willingly. The U.S., which deploys less than 1,100 SNDVs (see here), will have to do little in terms of staying within this limit.
Prior to the summit, the Russians had been insisting that the SNDV limit of START (1,600) be drastically reduced, some calling for it to be lowered to 600, others to as low as 300-400. The only conceivable reason the upper limit would be set at 1,100 is that President Obama listened to his military advisors and became a realist – that is, he recognized that it is completely unnecessary to cut our SNDVs to 50% of their current levels, especially since the Russians will have to make their cuts regardless. It makes no diplomatic sense to get nothing for something. Furthermore, U.S. SNDV levels may provide valuable leverage in dealing with Russian tactical nuclear weapons in any future treaty. Therefore, in this part of the agreement, it is likely that Obama’s realism and the strength of the U.S. position is responsible for maintaining an upper limit of 1,100 SNDVs.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of this agreement is the timeline. Obama and Medvedev have agreed to achieve these reductions within 7 years, almost 4 years after Obama’s first term will have expired. It seems to suggest that President Obama is not at all confident that he will get another strategic arms reduction treaty within this term or any future ones. His rhetoric notwithstanding, perhaps he has accepted that the Russians will simply not work towards “global nuclear zero” and will hold out next for reducing their tactical nuclear weapons. In any event, with the decommissioning of aging warheads, de-MIRVing of ICBMs (replacing multiple warheads with one per missile), and de-tubing of SSBNs (reducing the number of missiles on each submarine), the U.S. should easily reach the new limits within seven years.
Assuming there are no egregious caveats that emerge in this preliminary accord, such as linking missile defense to offensive systems or limiting U.S. conventional strategic capabilities (prompt global strike), this is a good agreement for the United States. It appears that President Obama took the advice of former Secretary of Defense (and nuclear abolitionist) William Perry (D) to keep it “simple and modest.” This agreement, again assuming no drastic compromises on missile defense or conventional capabilities, should be ratified by the Senate (after sufficient debate) before START I expires on 5 December 2009. If this is not a clear case study of realism dashing idealism, then nothing is.
Obama’s Moscow Summit – Which Way to START? July 5, 2009
Posted by Sean Varner in Nuclear Proliferation, President Obama, Russia, U.S. Foreign Relations.Tags: global zero, Medvedev, Missile Defense, nuclear reductions, Nuclear Weapons, President Obama, Russia, START Treaty
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President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev are meeting in Moscow to discuss a successor to the soon-to-expire Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). On the table for consideration (according to U.S. and/or Russian officials) are levels of deployed and stockpiled strategic nuclear warheads, strategic delivery systems (intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, and bombers), and missile defense. Off the table are nonstrategic (short-range) nuclear weapons, which the Russians hold in abundance.
Truly understanding the situation between Washington and Moscow requires a brief look at the numbers. The United States deploys around 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads (and ~ 2,500 reserves) on less than 1,000 missiles and bombers. Russia deploys about 2,700 strategic nuclear warheads (and thousands in reserve) on roughly 650 missiles and bombers. In nonstrategic nukes, Russia holds a massive advantage (3,000-5,000) over the United States (400-500). In terms of strategic delivery systems, the U.S. still has decades before most of its systems will need replaced, while many Russian systems will reach the end of their service lives within the next decade, reducing their numbers to around 330.
The Obama Administration, in its rush to conclude the START follow-on by the current treaty’s expiration date on December 5th, is therefore playing into the Russians’ hands. By pushing for deep warhead cuts (the Russians will not go below 1,500 deployed) and considering a further reduction in the permitted number of strategic delivery vehicles, U.S. negotiators are essentially getting nothing for something. Since the Russians will have to eliminate many of their aging warheads, missiles, and bombers with or without an arms control treaty, they are trying to maintain parity with the United States through a new START accord. In return, the U.S. is getting something it would have gotten without having to reduce the survivability and flexibility of its nuclear arsenal.
Until recently, the Obama Administration was seemingly giving credence to Russian objections to a third missile defense site in Central Europe. Even former Secretary of Defense (and nuclear abolitionist) William Perry (D) stated in House testimony that trading missile defense for Russian promises was absolutely unreasonable. The president’s special assistant, Michael McFaul, stated last week the U.S. was “not going to reassure or give or trade anything with the Russians regarding NATO expansion or missile defense.” This is a step in the right direction. Tying defensive conventional systems to offensive nuclear systems, which President Medvedev is still insisting on, is a relic of the Cold War “mutually assured destruction” thinking.
Therefore, the U.S. approach to the START follow-on has been fundamentally flawed. By agreeing not to include nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the limits, the U.S. allowed Russia to maintain its biggest geopolitical advantage. Many experts believe it is these “battlefield” nuke stockpiles that will be the likely source of any future nuclear terrorism or nuclear use by a state (Russia explicitly states they would be used to “de-escalate” an invasion of their homeland). Furthermore, once U.S. warhead and delivery system levels have been drastically reduced, Washington will little leverage to urge Moscow to reduce its tactical nukes.
The arms control process is also misguided in the link some are attempting to make between a new START and “global zero,” the nuclear abolitionist movement. The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission determined that complete nuclear disarmament required a “fundamental transformation of the world political order.” Guiding a new treaty along what optimists consider a decades-long goal is a recipe for miscalculation and bad decisions. The Obama Administration needs to take a step back, assess U.S. interests over the long term, and proceed with a modest START follow-on from there. Idealism is one thing. Dealing with the Russians about nuclear weapons is entirely different.
The Limits of the Iranian Election June 12, 2009
Posted by Sean Varner in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear Proliferation, President Obama, U.S. Foreign Relations.Tags: Admadinejad, Foreign Policy, Iranian election, Iranian nuclear program, Moussavi
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Much has been made about the Iranian election between current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and challenger Mir Hossein Moussavi (and two other candidates) taking place today, 12 June 2009 (see here and here for news coverage). While there are significant differences between the candidates, the impact of a possible Moussavi victory would be limited. There are indications that he would be more receptive to Obama’s overtures, that he would be less provocative in his statements (which may significantly alleviate, though not eliminate, Israel’s fears), and that he would place a higher priority on correcting the Iranian economy, which has been wracked by double-digit inflation and sanctions imposed for Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism. In these areas, Moussavi may prove to be a welcome change from Ahmadinejad for the West and Iran’s large young and educated population. The limits of his victory, however, would be noticed in two key areas.
Iranian Foreign Policy – here power has always rested with the Iranian clerics and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Though the president of Iran is the highest envoy that represents the government to the international arena, the real power in foreign policy lies with the Iranian religious leadership. Thus while Moussavi may be willing to improve relations with Washington, the decision to do anything substantive in that direction (versus simply warm talk) will come from the Ayatollah.
Iranian Nuclear Program – there is wide popular support in Iran for the nuclear program, with the BBC reporting in mid-2007 that a poll suggested 80% of Iranian’s believe their country needs nuclear energy. Furthermore, though they may not come out and advocate having nuclear weapons, many Iranians would want their country to have the option of producing such weapons through uranium enrichment capability. With many remembering the Iran-Iraq War and Saddam’s use of chemical weapons on Iranian cities, they recognize the utility of having a weapon powerful enough to deter such attacks from taking place again. As Willis Stanley points out in Strategic Culture and WMD, the Ayatollah and the clerics have recognized the value in possessing nukes, believing they would help fulfill Iran’s ambition to be leader of the Islamic world.
Therefore there are significant limits to the impact of the Iranian election. Obviously if Ahmadinejad is reelected, the situation will not change at all. If Moussavi succeeds in replacing him, however, relations with the West and Israel may improve as he would likely scale back provocative statements and work to lift sanctions to help reinvigorate Iran’s economy. This may assure Israel, the EU, and the U.S., but it is not likely to herald a transformative new relationship. Israel will still be nervous about an Iranian nuclear program, unlikely accepting it at all. The EU and the U.S. will continue insisting on IAEA inspections, which it is unclear whether the Ayatollah wishes to permit or not. And terrorism financing will likely continue through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard regardless of who is president. Far from being a silver bullet to mend international relations with Iran, the Iranian election, like most politics, is inherently local.
North Korea Conducts Another Nuclear Test May 25, 2009
Posted by Sean Varner in China, North Korea, Nuclear Proliferation, President Obama, Russia, U.S. Foreign Relations.Tags: CTBT, missile launch, North Korea, nuclear test, Nuclear Weapons, Six-Party Talks
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On 25 May 2009, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted its second nuclear test in three years (as well as three short-range missile tests). While South Korean security experts currently estimate the test was only several kilotons, Russian defense sources believe it to have been 10-20 kilotons (about equivalent to the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki). If this latter estimate is indeed true, or closer to the mark, it will signify a marked improvement in the DPRK’s nuclear capability since its October 2006 test. For the full stories on the test so far, see here and here.
The question arising now is how the international community will respond. President Obama has stated the DPRK is “directly and recklessly challenging the international community” and that it “constitutes a threat to international peace and stability.” He further notes that “such provocations will only serve to deepen North Korea’s isolation.” Thus while there is a clear recognition of the seriousness of these events, there appears to be no clear strategy for responding to them.
This problem cannot be laid entirely at Obama’s feet, however. During the Bush Administration, Washington placed several clear redlines to North Korean behavior (stop the nuclear program, no more missile tests, and finally no nuclear tests). When Pyongyang broke every one of these, the U.S. response was to call for a new round of Six-Party talks – which spent half their time trying to get the DPRK to the table. In fact, it became evident that a clear motivation for North Korea to take these actions was that it received substantial aid (food, energy) in exchange for it showing up at the negotiations. (If you go farther back, you can blame Former President Jimmy Carter for rushing to North Korea in 1994 to establish the Agreed Framework when the Clinton Administration was about to get really tough with the Kim clan).
Regardless of the history, the United States is now faced with a growing challenge. Though North Korea has likely not miniaturized its nuclear warheads to the point when they could fit on a missile, it may only be a matter of time. And though they may have only 6-10 nuclear devices, they may see that as enough to deter U.S. intervention in their attempt to force reunification of the peninsula.
How should the Obama Administration react to these developments then? Reinforcing the importance of the Six-Party talks is a waste of time. This should only be pursued if Washington has an absolute guarantee from Beijing and Seoul that they will cut off all aid and assistance to the DPRK. Emphasizing irrelevant steps like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is also detrimental to U.S. security. The U.S. has not conducted a nuclear test in over 15 years, and still the DPRK conducts tests – ratification of the CTBT will give the U.S. nothing in its toolbox to deal with North Korea while unnecessariliy constraining U.S. options (especially as its nuclear deterrent atrophies). So unless President Obama wants to do this same song and dance throughout his presidency (DPRK provocation, 6-Party Talks, DPRK aid), he will have to take forceful and concrete steps now, whatever they may be. North Korea is one of the most isolated nations in history, sanctions to isolate it further are next to impossible to enact. Exhibit leadership, consider all U.S. options, for the good of the national interest.
The Realist and the Idealist: the Netanyahu-Obama Meeting May 18, 2009
Posted by Sean Varner in Iran, Israel, Middle East, Nuclear Proliferation, President Obama, Saudi Arabia, U.S. Foreign Relations.Tags: Benjamin Netanyahu, Egypt, Iranian nuclear program, Israel, Obama, Saudi Arabia, Turkey
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On 18 May 2009, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with President Barak Obama to discuss a wide range of issues, but in particular the progress of the Iranian nuclear program and the possibility of a separate Palestinian state (see story here). The biggest agreement that came out of the meeting was the recognition that an Iranian nuclear weapon would be an existential threat to Israel and “profoundly destabilizing” to the world order.
There was, however, significant disagreement over the importance of working towards a Palestinian state. President Obama indicated his belief that real progress towards such a goal, including the rollback of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, would garner broader Arab and world support in the effort to stop Iran’s nuclear program. Prime Minister Netanyahu, however, recognized the reality that Israel faces. Reflecting Israeli strategic culture, he knows that Israel’s survival is constantly at stake, it must maintain military superiority (including nuclear) in the region, and Israel will use any means necessary to ensure its defense and survival. The issue of Palestinian statehood, therefore, can be left to the future when other preconditions of Israeli security are met.
The problem with President Obama’s approach – pushing for statehood as a prerequisite to attempting to court Arab support against Iran – is that it gives the Israelis little in return for a significant compromise to their security. A combination of realism and strategic culture explain why Arab support will be forthcoming anyway.
First of all, Iran is a significant regional power in Southwest Asia. It is a nation of 70+ million people, located astride of huge petroleum and natural gas reserves, and with a history of regional imperial domination (Persian and Parthian Empires). If it does end up going nuclear, it will create anxieties among its influential neighbors, notably Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Emirate Statse, and Turkey (Iraq being virtually under the U.S. umbrella). Unless these countries go nuclear, they fear Iran will use its new threat capability to exploit Saudi Arabia’s (Shia minority) and Turkey’s (Kurdish minority) internal problems. It’s sheer size and proximity will also allow it to more easily intimidate the Gulf states, perhaps convincing them to evict U.S. troops. Furthermore, if Saudi Arabia acquires a nuclear capability, Egypt will likely follow suit, seeing itself as the preeminent leader of the Arab world.
Second of all, Iran is the predominant (and a revolutionary) Shiite country in the region. As such, this will also create additional tensions with Saudi Arabia, which is the “holy land” of Sunni Islam. Also Turkey, an avowedly secular nation (though trending differently recently), will feel threatened by a revolutionary Iran armed with nukes. Which brings us to Israel, which as the only Jewish state in a sea of Muslim states, sees a nuclear armed Iran as an existential threat. Fearing that one bomb would irreversibly devastate Israel, its leaders will do whatever it takes to prevent another holocaust.
Therefore the Netanyahu-Obama summit illustrated the disconnect between the two leaders. Obama clearly hopes to build an international consensus on Iran by “solving” the Palestinian question. Netanyahu recognizes that Arab support is already there and that Israel must first confront the immediate threat of Iran before solving the long-term conflict with the Palestinians. With time dwindling before Iran assembles a nuclear device, there are few opportunities left to address this dire security threat. The international non-proliferation effort depends on a concerted and strong response.
Why Americans Aren’t Sold on the F-22 March 31, 2009
Posted by Sean Varner in China, Russia, U.S. Budget, U.S. Foreign Relations.Tags: China, deterrence, dissuasion, F-22, Future Weapons Systems, Russia, US Air Force
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The F-22 Raptor is the next generation fighter jet that has been designed to ensure American air superiority against any foe during the next several decades. Its advanced technology and tactical capabilities allow it to be part of a first-wave (counter)attack that could achieve penetration of enemy airspace and get a first look at the situation and strike multiple targets while maintaining low observability and high speeds. Yet the Air Force has only been able to acquire 181 of the 381-minimum it argues it needs to fulfill its objectives. Despite full-page ads in the national papers and relentless advertising, a significant groundswell of support is still lacking. Why, then, does the public not seem sold on the need for at least 200 more F-22s?
The answer is not principally the jet’s heavy price tag, a question of its capability, or any alleged mismanagement of the procurement program. The major objection is the one of utility. People simply want to know, “what do we need another fighter jet for?” This response should not come as a surprise. To the general public, exposed to the popular news media and statements by their elected officials, the main threat facing the United States is the one posed by terrorism. Defeating a heavily defended North Korea or Iran is scarcely discussed. The need to defend against the possibility of a resurgent Russia or rising China is not even mentioned. If the only threat on the horizon is terrorism, they reason, why do we need a next-generation fighter that cannot attack terrorists any better than the current jets we employ?
The Air Force, however, has thought about the possibilities of facing a rising peer competitor. They know that the record of American air dominance is something that must be maintained and not taken for granted. The US has not lost a single soldier to hostile military aircraft since the Korean War and has not had a pilot shot down since the Vietnam War. Such an achievement was due to vigorous R&D that produced top-of-the-line fighters that were able to achieve and hold air dominance after each of those respective conflicts. It is the judgment of the USAF that it could not reliably sustain global air dominance into the mid-21st century without the 381 F-22s. Without adequate numbers, those records may be broken and American servicemen will be paying the bill with their lives.
What, therefore, is the solution to this problem? Respected military commentators like Ralph Peters are telling Americans that the F-22 is a “supremely unnecessary air superiority fighter” because no power can match our control of the air at this time. Without a visible, clearly existential threat like the Soviet Union in existence, Americans tend to revert to their tradition of experiencing free security and expecting peace to be the norm in international relations. The threat inflation surrounding terrorism may cause many to realize the importance of a strong defense, but they are not putting their trust on something they believe is not useful in the War on Terror. The solution is, as Herman Kahn struggled to get across to the American public in the 1960s, to think about the unthinkable; in this case great power rivalry or war.
This is not to suggest by any means that supporters of the F-22 and other future combat systems should insist that war with China or Russia is inevitable and that is why this new and expensive fighter is needed. Rather, elected officials and defense experts should insist on a return to the strategy of deterrence. They must make the argument that not only will the Raptor ensure air superiority for 40 years, but that it is necessary to have that capability for dissuasion and deterrence. A strong case can be made that the F-22 will dissuade rising competitors like China from challenging the US in the realm of air combat. Its advanced avionics and high technology can also deter a resurgent (and uppity) Russia from seeking a fait accompli in any future aggression against Eastern Europe (assuming F-22s are deployed in Europe).
To conclude, the F-22 is in trouble because Americans simply do not understand its utility and believe it is an unnecessary Cold War relic. This impression can only be reversed by policy-makers and experts insisting that the US return to a strategy of deterrence and dissuasion in order to defend against future peer competitors. If the US does not develop this fighter, its record of sustaining air superiority in every conflict since Vietnam may be at risk, or at least heavily compromised. Investment in the F-22 is a form of insurance, and the public must understand that, though it may seem like a high premium for a low-risk possibility, it will have a huge pay-off in direct (conflict) and indirect (deterrence and dissuasion) results.
Obama’s Foreign Policy Report Card at 50 Days March 11, 2009
Posted by Sean Varner in Asia, China, Iran, Japan, Middle East, Nuclear Proliferation, President Obama, Russia, U.S. Foreign Relations, United Nations.Tags: 50 Days, economic crisis, Foreign Policy, Missile Defense, North Korea, Obama, United Kingdom
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A brief look at President Obama’s foreign policy performance over the first 50 days of his tenure in office in no particular order:
Russia: D+
Main issue: There are no mulligans in international relations.
Analysis: At the suggestion of Vice President Biden that the US should somehow “reset” its relationship with Russia after the cooling tensions during the second term of the Bush Administration, Secretary of State Clinton had a red “reset” button made for her Russian counterpart to press. Never mind that the translation was actually “overcharge” (as if that doesn’t sound bad enough), the issue is in the gesture. As one should recall, the reason for cooling relations with Russia were mostly due to Russian provocations. Let’s examine the record: attempted radiological assassination of dissidents in the UK or political opponents in Ukraine, a cyber attack on Lithuania, a coercive shut-off of European natural-gas supplies, and, most significantly, the invasion of Georgia during the “let’s-all-come-together” spirit of the Olympics. If anyone should be coming to a meeting hat-in-hand and apologizing for past conduct, it should be the Russians. That being said, improving relations with Russia is a worthy goal. However, by going about it through new arms control and nuclear reductions treaties, the US is still stating that its relationship with Moscow is based on the number of warheads each country has pointed at the other.
Lesson: The Cold War is over. Russia is fundamentally weak both economically and demographically. Keep Moscow happy by making it feel like its opinion matters, even if it doesn’t (i.e., missile defenses).
North Korea: B+
Main issue: Satellite launches? Baloney – everyone knows what North Korean missiles are for.
Analysis: During her Asian tour, Secretary of State Clinton was preempted in her agenda by aggressive statements from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that threatened new ballistic missile launches. Rather than discuss global warming and trade, (thankfully) she was forced to put her emphasis on security matters. Secretary Clinton delivered a tough line by stating that the US would regard any new missile launches as hostile and damaging to the US-DPRK relationship. She also wisely reassured Japan that the US would honor its nuclear guarantee to Tokyo, staving off talk about Japan becoming a nuclear weapons power. Standard military exercises involving the US and Republic of Korea (ROK – South Korea) have continued despite routine yet dramatic objections from Pyongyang. And the US has not (yet) taken the possibility of shooting down a North Korean missile off the table (thank you, President Bush for those missile defenses).
Lesson: Taking a tough line demonstrates resolve to North Korea. Don’t make regime change the stated policy. Keep the pressure up, get China and ROK to turn off the spigot of food and energy, and then maybe Pyongyang will disarm.
Iran: C -
Main issue: Once Iran enriches Uranium to 20%, its a matter of weeks until they have the bomb.
Analysis: Admittedly, Obama inherited a bad situation with Iran. Trying to make the most of it, he has attempted to start up talks in secret and in public to get the Iranians to the table. With every day that goes by (and especially without IAEA inspectors at Natanz), Iran comes closer and closer to enriching Uranium to the 20% level, after which it takes weeks to months to enrich it to 90%, which is weapons-grade. What more, then, could Obama be doing? It is clear to everybody; let me rephrase, to all members of the UN Security Council, that Iran is in clear violation of its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA obligations. With his supposed global popularity, Obama should be trying to get a resolution passed with teeth that mandates immediate inspections of Iranian facilities and places sanctions on Tehran’s critical nodes – oil technology, foreign investment, and nuclear-related equipment. However, the Iranians continue to stall for time, endlessly playing the great powers off of each other and approaching that necessary enrichment level more and more.
Lesson: The time for open-ended diplomacy is at an end. Iran needs to be presented with stark choices, juicy carrots or hickory sticks, and realize the threat of force from the global community is real. Best outcome? Iran verifiabily limits its nuclear program to civilian power.
China: C +
Main issue: You DO NOT mess with the US Navy.
Analysis: On 8 March 2009, 5 Chinese ships (some of them part of the PLA Navy) shadowed and harassed the USNS Impeccable while it was mapping the ocean floor in international waters in the South China Sea. The US crew responded by shooting a water hose at the approaching Chinese ships, causing their sailors to strip off their clothes in taunting. In response to this provocation, Secretary of State Clinton met with her Chinese counterpart and both agree incidents of this kind should be “avoided” in the future. In the words of a second grader, “well duh.” What would have been more meaningful would have been if the Chinese had issued an apology for harassing a US Navy vessel in international waters. The US Navy is the most feared and respected navy in the world because people understand its awesome power. Letting a state get away with this, and making it seem that both sides were at fault, undermines this image. As far as the economic crisis goes, the Obama Administration has at least worked cooperatively with the PRC and prevented them from unloading some of their $1.5 trillion in US debt holdings. So, for not making economic matters worse with our biggest trading partner, they get a C minus.
Lesson: Primacy is a difficult burden to bear, but if you begin to relax it, other states get uppity. Insist on respect to the US armed services deployed around the world and that any “rogue commanders” are publicly reprimanded.
United Kingdom: A -
Main issue: I know we’re in a recession, but that’s not an excuse for being a cheapskate.
Analysis: Though little covered in the American press, more was made of the exchange of gifts between President Obama and Prime Minister Gordon Brown in the UK media. While Obama received a pen carved from a 19th-century ship used to suppress the slave trade, Obama’s gift to Brown was a collection of 25 DVDs (I don’t know if they were region 1 or 2) of American classics. That’s not to denigrate the gift; the films were all undisputably American classics (actually they’re the top 25 from AFI’s 2008 list of the top 100 American films), some of them the best films ever made (see: Casablanca and The Godfather). Though, I might be worried that Brown would attempt to burn the White House down (a la the War of 1812) if he is subjected to 2001: A Space Odyssey. On more meaningful matters, the alliance still holds and economic cooperation is continuing.
Lesson: Rookie mistakes are embarassing but seldom have long-term consequences. I know money’s tight, but show some class in your gift-giving. Don’t tempt foreign prime ministers to be re-gifters.
Average: C+
Room to improve, but the sooner Obama gets his sea legs and stops making amateurish mistakes, the better for everyone.
Chavez’s Referendum and Washington’s Response February 17, 2009
Posted by Sean Varner in Democracy, President Obama, South America, U.S. Foreign Relations.Tags: Hugo Chavez, Obama Administration, referendum, State Department, Venezuela
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On 16 February 2009, it was announced that Chavez had won his referendum to remove term limits from all political offices, including his own, by a 54% to 46% margin (see story here). This came after the government spent unknown (but large) sums of money on promoting a positive vote on the referendum, after TV stations (mostly state-run) were required to air speeches and promotions favoring the referendum, and after pressure was placed on the two million state employees to both get out the vote and of course vote “yes” on the ballot.
Chavez therefore shamelessly wielded the full powers of the government at his disposal to push through the referendum (which had failed just last year) that would allow him to run again for president in 2012. Democracies tend not to function well when one leader maintains executive power limitlessly, a key reason most democracies (both American-style republics and parliamentary ones) place term limits on their executives. The Venezuelan opposition was obviously disappointed by this vote result, seeing it as a key turn on the steady road to both socialism and dictatorship under Hugo Chavez. As one commented on seeing the throngs cheering for Chavez, “these people don’t realize what they have done.”
What, then, was the response from Washington to this troubling development? Condemnation that Chavez had rigged the vote or at least improperly used government tools and money to do so? No. Statement of support to the opposition to continue its fight to preserve Venezuelan democracy? No. Expressed disappointment of the results? No. Silence?? No. The State Department actually welcomed the results of the referendum, admiring Venezuelans’ “civic spirit” (see here).
Forget President Obama’s pledge to conduct direct talks with Venezuela (which may have had some merit), this is outright validation and support for his style of governing Venezuela. The Administration has actually supported the results of a referendum that removed term limits from Hugo Chavez, an avowed enemy of Washington, by praising the democratic spirit of Venezuelans. People voting is not the issue here – what they’ve just voted for is. What does this say about President Obama and his Administration’s view of valid and legimitate democracies?
What’s more, the US gains nothing in this pitiful attempt at rapprochement with Caracas. Chavez has already stated that Obama carries the same “stench” as Bush. Also, with Chavez’s future support seemingly tenuous, it makes no logical sense to endorse his referendum if he may not be reelected anyway. Why alienate the opposition that may be coming back into power in a few years?
Why am I so optimistic about the future of Venezuela? Well, with oil at around $40 a barrel, Chavez cannot afford to continue his welfare-state spending and keep the poor happy with wealth redistrubition. The government in Caracas already spends around 32% of the country’s GDP, levels that will grow more unsustainable as oil remains below the $60 threshold. Also, with inflation at 36% and foreign debt totalling between $30-40 billion, Venezuela is on a road to hard times. And hard times almost certainly means punishing the executive in power – Hugo Chavez.
Therefore, Washington’s welcoming and validation of this referendum is certainly an unwise and destructive move. By lending even a little more legitimacy to Chavez, he may well be able to strengthen his hold on power. With the world economy likely to remain chaotic for the next several years, all the US had to do (this is simplifying it a bit) was sit and wait (and maybe proactively invest in surrounding South American countries) for Venezuelans to vote Chavez out of office. Instead, we may be setting him up to be the next Castro, a thorn (and much bigger one) in America’s side for decades to come.
The Nuclear Entrepreneur: A.Q. Khan is Released from House Arrest February 8, 2009
Posted by Sean Varner in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear Proliferation, Science, U.S. Foreign Relations.Tags: A.Q. Khan, Islamabad, NPT, nuclear program, Pakistan, proliferation
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On Friday, 6 February 2009, the man most responsible for nuclear proliferation in the world today was released from his light punishment of house arrest in Pakistan. Abdul Qadeer Khan was released from house arrest (see here) after, according to his lawyer, he was ruled to be not guilty by the Islamabad High Court. While the State Department thought this ruling was “extremely regrettable” (see here), it warrants a much more outraged response towards Pakistan.
Volumes have been written on A.Q. Khan’s illicit activities and nuclear proliferating; a comprehensive work is Shopping for Bombs by Gordon Corera. However, the story received little critical attention in the media, as the economic stimulus package continued to dominate the coverage. A brief synopsis of Khan’s activities illustrate why this is an important issue. While working as a metallurgical scientist in the Netherlands in the 1970s, Khan stole plans and blueprints for centrifuge equipment (used for enriching uranium) and brought it back to Pakistan. During the rest of that decade and the 1980s, he worked on building a nuclear bomb for Pakistan using the technical data he had stolen, contacts he had made with businesses that manufactured the specialized equipment that he needed, and uranium and a nuclear warhead design imported from China. During the 1980s and 1990s he turned entrepreneur and began exporting this technology and organizing sales of specialized equipments to countries that were willing to pay the price. Because of the extent and capabilities of the A.Q. Khan Network, North Korea was able to develop nuclear weapons and Iran is well on the way to achieving the same feat. Libya was also on the path to this capability until it turned over its nuclear program to the US and UK in 2003 (which included the blueprints for a nuclear warhead obtained from Khan as a “bonus” to a sale of 20,000 centrifuges).
The A.Q. Khan Network thus become known as the Wal-Mart of nuclear technology.
The damage this network did to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and arms control is virtually irreversible. Taking full advantage of the globalized world, it exported nuclear technology and equipment to any nation that could pay the price, and suffered almost no punitive consequences (it was, after all, not a state). It almost single-handedly added two new nuclear-weapons states to the international system (three if Libya had not given up its program when it did), and allegedly had contacts with many more nations that may be going nuclear (Saudi Arabia, Egypt). We now live in a much more dangerous world due to the activities of this group, driven by ideological and monetary motives.
Pakistan’s weak punishment to the center of this network is indicative of the growing influence of Islamists in the country. A.Q. Khan is heralded by many of them as the “Father of the Islamic Bomb” and, as such, is considered a national hero. It is perhaps a warning sign that Islamabad will not remain friendly to the US for long. Pakistan is increasingly becoming a dysfunctional democracy, with little control over most of its territory, that is on the brink of either collapse or internal regime change. It is time the US move closer to India and Iran to try to limit the damage that may be caused when this nuclear-weapons state simply implodes or changes governments. Tragically, it could become a failed state with nuclear weapons, much more dangerous than Iran to US interests.
The Illogic of “Going to Zero” in Nuclear Weapons February 4, 2009
Posted by Sean Varner in China, Japan, Middle East, Nuclear Proliferation, President Obama, Russia, Saudi Arabia, U.S. Foreign Relations.Tags: arms control, CTBT, Logic of Zero, nuclear reductions, Nuclear Weapons, Obama, proliferation, START Treaty
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President Obama has announced his intentions to cut the number of nuclear warheads by around 80%, bringing the total down from the approximately 5,000 in the inventory to about 1,000. This intention flows from his hope in achieving a nuclear weapons-free world, a philosophy that is very attractive and has gained a lot of support, especially with the influential article “The Logic of Zero” by Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal. There were indications that Sen. John McCain even supported this idea. The reason for its broad support is clear. Who wants to have nuclear weapons around anyway? They are massively destructive, they are indiscriminate, they damage the environment, they haven’t been used in war in 64 years anyway, and the only reason states still have them is because of the massive US and Russian stockpiles. It is an attractive argument, but in the next five points I’ll attempt to point out its inherent flaws and lack of foresight in this argument and in President Obama’s plans for deep reductions.
First, the American nuclear arsenal is growing more obsolete and unreliable by the day. Since it has been several decades since the last US nuclear test (due in part to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), there is growing uncertainty over the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal. The failure of the Congress to approve the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, which would have updated US warheads to make them safer (for storage, maintenance) and more, well, reliable, has brought into question the credibility of Washington’s nuclear deterrent. If a problem were discovered in one of our warhead designs, the US could lose up to one-third of its operational capability while the problem was being fixed. The US is currently the only nuclear weapons state that is neither producing new weapons nor actively upgrading its existing ones.
Second, the arms race action-reaction cycle in which the US is the cause of other states building nukes has been disproved. This was the logic behind much of the Cold War-era arms control negotiations, and the Logic of Zero debate, that holds that the rest of the world continues to pursue and build nuclear capabilities because the US, the most powerful state in the system, has them. The fallacy of this should be evident immediately. As President Carter’s Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, stated (here) when talking about the US and Soviet Union arms races: “when we build, they build, and when we stop building, they continue building.” Currently, notes Adam Hebert of Air Force Magazine, “despite 16 years of American cuts and testing moratoriums, rogue states such as Iran and North Korea have not slowed their own [nuclear] programs.”
Third, such a move will greatly disadvantage the US in terms of the balance of nuclear forces. By going to 1,000 warheads, and assuming the Russians comply with their obligations to do likewise, the US will be in a vastly weaker situation in East Asia. China currently has approximately 200 warheads, and is building more, so it is imaginable that by the time the US has reduced to 1,000 warheads, China will possess close to 250. That would give the US a scant 4-1 advantage over Beijing (and some US nuclear forces will not even be in the Asian theater), compared to its more than 25-1 current advantage. Such a drastic change will likely give the regime in Beijing the ability to exercise a freer hand in East Asia, particularly with regards to US allies like Japan and Taiwan. North Korea, which currently faces over a 300-1 disadvantage, would find itself in about a 60-1 disadvantage, which could only help but make Pyongyang feel more secure.
Fourth, such deep cuts to the American inventory will actually cause nuclear proliferation to speed up. Already, US allies such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, doubtful of the strength of the diminished US nuclear umbrella in the face of a nuclear Iran, are making decisions to pursue the foundations of their own nuclear programs. If the US brings its numbers so low that China will be close to achieving parity, allies such as Japan, South Korea, or even Taiwan may decide to go nuclear (For those who think a China with a 4-1 disadvantage would not be a threat, keep in mind the USSR had a 6 or 7-1 disadvantage with the US at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis). Therefore the goal of reaching a nuclear weapons-free world will be self-defeated as more countries decide to pursue a nuclear capability. The world is simply too dangerous a place for states to give up their nuclear weapons.
Fifth, and finally, eliminating (or drastically cutting) nuclear weapons will only make the world safe for conventional warfare. For decades during the Cold War, America’s nuclear forces deterred aggression, reduced the risk of conventional attack in Europe and elsewhere, and held invulnerable enemy targets at risk. The death toll of the 20th century before 1945 was tragic, with war deaths in the tens to a hundred million range. After 1945, the death toll due to war was kept around 1 million a year, most of that due to low-intensity proxy wars or ethnic conflict. The truth is, nuclear weapons have kept great powers from going to war, and this promise should be enough to continue to maintain them for an effective deterrent posture. Conventional war is ugly, nuclear war may be uglier, but the existence of nuclear weapons produces a higher probability of preventing either from breaking out on a massive scale.
The Cold War may in fact be over, but the world is still a dangerous and far-from-perfect place. As US Strategic Command commander Gen. Kevin Chilton has noted, the security environment today is different “purely [in] intent – not capability… intent can change overnight.” As long as intent can change overnight, because nations cannot trust each other completely, then the US needs to maintain an effective, robust, and significant nuclear deterrent. Nonsolutions to securing the strategic environment, like reducing nukes to zero, only will hurt the national security of the US, and lead to nuclear proliferation and the increased risk of war.
Adam Nowland
Sean Varner