Politically Incorrect

Much has been made about the Iranian election between current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and challenger Mir Hossein Moussavi (and two other candidates) taking place today, 12 June 2009 (see here and here for news coverage).  While there are significant differences between the candidates, the impact of a possible Moussavi victory would be limited.  There are indications that he would be more receptive to Obama’s overtures, that he would be less provocative in his statements (which may significantly alleviate, though not eliminate, Israel’s fears), and that he would place a higher priority on correcting the Iranian economy, which has been wracked by double-digit inflation and sanctions imposed for Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism.  In these areas, Moussavi may prove to be a welcome change from Ahmadinejad for the West and Iran’s large young and educated population.  The limits of his victory, however, would be noticed in two key areas.

Iranian Foreign Policy – here power has always rested with the Iranian clerics and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  Though the president of Iran is the highest envoy that represents the government to the international arena, the real power in foreign policy lies with the Iranian religious leadership.  Thus while Moussavi may be willing to improve relations with Washington, the decision to do anything substantive in that direction (versus simply warm talk) will come from the Ayatollah.

Iranian Nuclear Program – there is wide popular support in Iran for the nuclear program, with the BBC reporting in mid-2007 that a poll suggested 80% of Iranian’s believe their country needs nuclear energy.  Furthermore, though they may not come out and advocate having nuclear weapons, many Iranians would want their country to have the option of producing such weapons through uranium enrichment capability.  With many remembering the Iran-Iraq War and Saddam’s use of chemical weapons on Iranian cities, they recognize the utility of having a weapon powerful enough to deter such attacks from taking place again.  As Willis Stanley points out in Strategic Culture and WMD, the Ayatollah and the clerics have recognized the value in possessing nukes, believing they would help fulfill Iran’s ambition to be leader of the Islamic world.

Therefore there are significant limits to the impact of the Iranian election.  Obviously if Ahmadinejad is reelected, the situation will not change at all.  If Moussavi succeeds in replacing him, however, relations with the West and Israel may improve as he would likely scale back provocative statements and work to lift sanctions to help reinvigorate Iran’s economy.  This may assure Israel, the EU, and the U.S., but it is not likely to herald a transformative new relationship.  Israel will still be nervous about an Iranian nuclear program, unlikely accepting it at all.  The EU and the U.S. will continue insisting on IAEA inspections, which it is unclear whether the Ayatollah wishes to permit or not.  And terrorism financing will likely continue through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard regardless of who is president.  Far from being a silver bullet to mend international relations with Iran, the Iranian election, like most politics, is inherently local.