One-Sided Arms Control April 26, 2010
Posted by Sean Varner in Nuclear Proliferation, President Obama, Russia, U.S. Foreign Relations, Uncategorized.Tags: Europe, global zero, nuclear reductions, Nuclear Weapons, START Treaty, Trident
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[This article was first published by the Center for Vision and Values here: http://www.visandvals.org/One_Sided_Arms_Control.php]
President Obama signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in Prague on April 8—and did so to global accolades. It was the culmination of years of negotiations and a major triumph to finally achieve agreement with Moscow. Unfortunately, President Obama’s signature was attached to a naïve arms control treaty that threatens the strength of the U.S. nuclear umbrella that defends over 30 friends and allies. It compromises American interests while benefiting the Russians and weakening international security and stability.
On the surface, START looks like a reasonable albeit constrictive treaty. The 800 delivery-vehicle limit on bombers and missiles is about 100 below what is currently deployed. The 1,550 nuclear-warhead limit can easily be achieved by retiring some aging B-52s and changing the way they are counted. The treaty provides for telemetry exchanges (information from missile test launches), which promotes mutual trust. It also contains no overt constraints on missile defense or the ability to deploy non-nuclear systems with global reach.
A quick glance at the treaty’s effects is more troubling. The 800 delivery-vehicle limit will cut valuable systems used to defend the United States and reassure its allies. Conversely, Russia only has to continue already planned decommissioning of obsolete missiles and submarines. The U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force will probably have to be reduced from 450 to 400 deployed missiles. The most survivable nuclear platforms, stealthy ballistic-missile submarines, will shrink by two submarines to remove four dozen missiles from accountability.
The bomber fleet will be limited to 18 stealth B-2s and dozens of 50-year-old B-52s. The remainder will be converted to conventional-only capabilities or simply eliminated. The future triad of missiles, submarines, and bombers will therefore be smaller, less flexible, and less capable of reassuring America’s friends and allies in threatening environments.
These cuts may seem minimal, but when the missile reductions are combined with the cancellation of NASA’s Constellation program, they could severely weaken the already decimated industrial base. The solid-rocket-motor industry is particularly vulnerable to collapse. An inability to sustain and replace valuable systems like ballistic missiles will have long-term negative consequences for our scientific and deterrent capability.
While the new warhead limit is 30 percent below the Moscow Treaty of 2002 limit, complicated counting rules give the Russians a whopping advantage. Each Russian bomber can carry eight warheads on cruise missiles, with the potential for more in the bomb bay. Under the New START, those 76 bombers count as only 76 warheads. Therefore, Moscow could deploy 500 or more warheads above the 1,550 limit, which would put it equal or above the Moscow Treaty limits. The United States, with its strict adherence to treaty law, will not imitate such devious accounting to ignore the 1,550 limit. Can we say the same for the Russian Federation?
The Bush administration began talks on a successor to START in its final years. The Obama administration publicly designated negotiations as the centerpiece of its “reset” with Russia and rushed negotiations in such a manner that the Russians knew exactly who wanted the treaty more. As former Bush administration official Stephen Rademaker has argued, you do not go to a car dealer and say “I absolutely positively have to have that car and I need it today, how much is it?” However, that is exactly what the president has done. In an effort to meet arbitrary deadlines, the American negotiators made multiple unnecessary concessions, most notably abandoning the missile-defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. Now Russia is objecting to any future missile-defense deployments, saying they would be cause to withdraw from the New START.
This treaty is different from past nuclear reductions in one important aspect: It is meant as a “down-payment” on President Obama’s pledge for moving toward a “world without nuclear weapons,” rather than to primarily improve U.S. national security. President Obama needs START to (among other things) justify his Nobel Peace Prize. He will push senators to provide their advice and consent for ratification of a bad treaty. Although many senators will want to avoid the pro-nuclear weapon label, the existence of these weapons has guaranteed American security for over 60 years.
The New START has turned out to be a golden missed opportunity. Instead of negotiating a treaty with modest reductions and extensive verification provisions, the administration opted for a bold approach. Proponents argue that the United States no longer needs the nuclear force structure it has from the Cold War. They assert that America’s conventional superiority can increasingly fulfill the mission of nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons, however, do not have the same deterrent effect provided by nuclear forces. As Margaret Thatcher observed, “There are monuments to the futility of conventional deterrence in every village in Europe.” Until the international security environment is severely improved, drastic reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons will not make the world more secure. Address the root causes of conflict between states, and wider nuclear reductions will be more successful and constructive.
The British Exit the World Stage December 9, 2009
Posted by Sean Varner in Asia, United Nations.Tags: India, Nuclear Deterrent, Trident, United Kingdom
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The United Kingdom does not apparently wish to continue its role as a great power in the international system. Internally, it is facing a viable Scottish National Party (SNP) that is pushing for independence from the UK (can anyone imagine two countries on the island of Britain?). Little else could delegitimize London more thoroughly than its loss of control over the northern half of its home island. Except, perhaps, the unilateral nuclear disarmament of the UK. Though this would certainly increase its standing among the publics of the world, few great powers would treat it as an equal.
Though the SNP has been the loudest in calling for the complete elimination of the UK nuclear deterrent (see here), the Labour Party has at least been willing to put off or drawdown replacement of the Trident fleet (the UK’s nuclear deterrent consists of 4 Trident ballistic-missile submarines). A random sampling of the Times of London and Daily Mail will indicate that most elites favor scrapping Trident replacement, if not eliminating it altogether (see articles here and here and a scaremongering piece here). If Britain were to not pursue Trident replacement because it was “no longer needed” (the subs’ service life should last another 15-20 years), it would be a momentous and perhaps irreversible decision that further marginalized its role in world affairs. The unilateral disarmament of the UK would cause once steadfast allies to question its continued importance in security affairs.
Currently all permanent members of the UN Security Council possess nuclear weapons. If London were to gradually or suddenly disarm, could it defend its continued position on that powerful body? Might not other countries, who are more eager to demonstrate their willingness to embrace Atlas and take a lead in world affairs, consider themselves more deserving of that coveted UNSC seat? Perhaps, as the British Empire finally devolves to the point where all that is left England and Wales, an inheritor of the British legacy will be willing to rise to take its place. India, once the “crown jewel” of the British Empire, may take its place as the royal head instead. Its economy is much larger than the UK’s, has a larger population (by a factor of about 18:1), and it has nuclear weapons. New Delhi, unlike London, does not appear quite so ready to disarm (as evidenced by its vote on a UN resolution on nuclear disarmament). The decision lies in London’s hands right now. Does it wish to become a rump state and a distant shadow of its former self or will it renew its resolve to be a player in international security affairs?